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Ending Protracted Conflicts:
The Oslo Peace Process Between
Political Partnership and Legality
Ian S. Lustick*
Introduction
If the Oslo peace process is considered within the category of other
extended processes of negotiation and attempted reconciliation, such as
those underway in Northern Ireland, those preceding the French with-
drawal from Algeria, those leading to the American departure from Viet-
nam, or those resulting in the end of apartheid in South Africa, an
interesting and important pattern emerges. If each of these is considered,
in some sense, as a "peace process," then we can see that success entails
transforming a partisan political deal struck between moderate segments
of the political systems into a binding settlement of outstanding issues
expressed, within each polity, as a depoliticized array of legal conditions.
Accordingly, the success of a peace process can eventually be charted
by the extent to which the language of the agreement is treated not as a
political/diplomatic document whose ambiguities represent resources for
those in each polity committed to the principles underlying the agreement,
but as a set of rules whose contravention is really treated, within each pol-
ity, as criminal. In the short term, however, moving too quickly to treat
what is still an evolving political partnership as a legal framework for maxi-
mizing advantage, involving due sanctions, and exploiting loopholes, can
be a particularly effective method for destroying the peace process itself.
Appreciation of this dynamic and its permutations is necessary to
understand the fate of the Israel-Palestinian Oslo peace process. Almost
since its inception, opponents of the process itself and the principles of
compromise upon which it is based, sought to interrupt, stall, complicate,
and even thwart it by treating (prematurely, from the point of view of its
supporters) the agreement as a legal codex rather than a political frame-
work. Following the Likud victory of 1996 and the ascension of Benjamin
Netanyahu to his office as Prime Minister, this fundamentally disingenu-
ous policy-acceptance of Oslo as a legal process in order to end Oslo as a
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political process-has been adopted and implemented by the Israeli govern-
ment itself.
To be sure, many opponents of Oslo, both among Palestinians as well
as Israelis, have preferred to reject Oslo by rejecting the very idea of polit-
ical compromise. Thus, Jewish settlers and others on Israel's annexationist
right have decried the inevitable sacrifice of Jewish control and sovereignty
over precious parts of the "Land of Israel." Palestinian opponents usually
emphasize the abandonment of the right of return, the humiliating weak-
ness and dependence of the Palestinian entity likely to emerge, the Judaiza-
tion of el-Quds1 seemingly enabled by the agreement, and the continued
presence and expansion of Jewish settlements in lands occupied in 1967
that they expect will be associated with any final negotiated agreement
emerging from the Oslo process.
In the Palestinian context, where civil society is weak and where few
expect elections to be regular, fair, or capable of changing governments,
terrorist attacks and explicit, ideologically-based rejection of the whole pro-
cess may make more sense as opposition tactics. But despite the opening
the Rabin assassination gave to the Likud in the 1996 election, such meth-
ods are not, in general, and specifically in the Israeli case, the most effec-
tive ways to block the road to political compromise.
In politics with regular elections and strong civil societies, shifts in
public opinion have real and unavoidable political consequences. In such
political systems, the ability of a compromise-oriented government to move
the whole polity toward an overall agreement can create the mystique of
peace and the utopian image of a promised reconciliation. These influ-
ences can blur the edges of dissatisfaction with the actual terms of the
agreement, thereby helping sustain the process during a period when the
costs of compromise seem obviously high, while the benefits seem distant
and uncertain. Therefore, the most sophisticated opposition strategy is to
attack the process based on a disingenuous acceptance of it-an accept-
ance expressed via insistence that "the other side" honor the "terms of the
agreement." In essence, the tactic employed is to treat the process, not as a
politically strategic, inevitably adapting, and intrinsically ambiguous
framework for incubating trust and reconciliation, but as an array of legal-
istic and definitive limits for the opposing sides or as an array of loop-holes
and opportunities for the aggressive, adversarial exploitation of opportuni-
ties for one's own side. Instead of operating according to standards of a
political partnership, where the signatories of the agreement recognize
between themselves that they have substantially more in common with one
another than they do with extreme elements in their own polities and see
their primary task as broadening the bases of support for compromise
while protecting the "domestic" political position of their partners, sophis-
ticated opponents of the process invoke the rules and standards of an
adversarial legal environment. In this context, with each "side" portrayed
1. Arabic for "The Holy"-the Muslim name of the city Jews call "Yerushalayim" and
Christians call 'Jerusalem."
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in a bargaining relationship and figured as "united" against its national
enemy, every "legal" opportunity within the agreement to constrain, fault,
or punish the other side, or to advance one's own side's claims against
those of the adversary, is vigorously pursued.
I. The Politics of Oscillation in Israel
Consideration of patterns in Israeli politics prior to the Oslo Agreement
shows the polarized and bitterly antagonistic struggle that developed
within the country. This struggle was waged between "annexationists"-
those committed for ideological reasons to maintain Israeli rule over all of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District)-and
those for whom these territories, although acknowledged as portions of the
"Land of Israel," were perceived as burdens and as bargaining chips in
peace negotiations with the Palestinian Arabs. Long before Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish fundamentalist infuriated by
the Labor Party government's willingness to relinquish these "holy" areas,
the division on this issue had given rise to a kulturkampf, including polit-
ical polarization, a vituperative public discourse, and many instances of
violence and intimidation.2
The 1982 Lebanon War revealed that there was more emotional and
political distance between these groups of Israeli Jews than between the
dovish side of the Israeli spectrum and the mainstream of the Palestinian
movement. With annexationists and ultranationalists in command of the
government and the military, a self-described "war of choice" was launched
to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization, with the hope of sealing
the future of the West Bank and Gaza as permanently incorporated within
Israel. The war, marked by massacres of Palestinians and heavy Israeli cas-
ualties, sparked a mutiny of high-ranking officers against Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon, resistance to the use of Israeli reservists, and unprecedented,
mass demonstrations against the government following the Sabra and Sha-
tilla massacres of Palestinian refugees. The anti-war movement was fueled
mainly by a sense that the government was using the army to implement a
controversial political program that contradicted chances for peace enter-
tained by half the population. The controversy over the Lebanon War,
including a fatal grenade attack on a dovish rally by right-wing extremists,
laid the groundwork for the debate inside Israel over whether to treat the
Palestinian uprising (Intifada) of 1987-93 as a war in which victory over the
enemy was to be achieved at any cost or as a signal that political negotia-
tions with the PLO were the only route to a satisfactory future.
This distinctive set of circumstances- an electorate deeply and stably,
yet very evenly, divided-produced a pattern of extremely close elections
between 1984 and 1996. For example, fewer than 30,000 votes out of
nearly three million made the hawkish Benjamin Netanyahu Prime Minis-
ter instead of the dovish Shimon Peres. The same kind of virtually "acci-
2. IAN S. LUSTICK, UNSETTLED STATES, DIsPuTED LAiNs: BRITAIN AND IRELAND, FRANcE
AND ALGERIA, ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK/GAzA 361-438 (1993).
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dental" margin, i.e., within the range of random perturbation, that decided
the outcome of the 1984 election, when only 180 votes separated the
annexationist from the anti-annexationist parties, also determined the out-
come of the 1988 election when a terrorist attack just before the polls
opened shifted just enough support to the right to prevent a victory for the
Labor Party. This same pattern was reflected in the formation of the 1990
ultranationalist government, instead of a militantly dovish Peres govern-
ment, because of the last minute decision of a nonagenarian Rabbi.3 Over-
all, Israeli politics has witnessed a kind of oscillation between
governments. Some have been vigorously committed to ruling out peace
negotiations by creating settlements and other facts on the ground before
their opponents could return to office. These include the hawkish Begin
and Shamir governments from 1977 to 1984, the hawkish governments led
by Shamir between 1986 and 1992, and the Netanyahu government of
1996. Other governments have been vigorously committed to launching a
substantive negotiating process to rule out the annexationist ambitions of
the other side. These include the Peres government of 1985-86, the Peres
shadow government in the tumultuous caretaker period of early 1990, and
the Rabin and Peres government that took power after the 1992 elections
with a one vote margin in the Parliament. Indeed, it is this pattern of oscil-
lation, coupled with beliefs by each political camp that it would endure,
that accounts for the increasing vigor, and even desperation, with which
succeeding governments sought to implement their (conflicting) visions of
the future.
II. Who Are the Real Partners
The intense political competition between the Likud and its annexationist
allies and the Labor party and its anti-annexationist allies, each perceived
by the other as capable of ruining the other's dreams and bringing the
other's nightmares to life, is the context for understanding what Prime
Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres meant by their repeated evoca-
tion of Arafat, the PLO, and the Palestinians as "partners." Some quota-
tions by leaders of the Labor government between 1993 and 1996 are
typical of the formulas used to characterize and promote the peace process.
Rabin has stated that, 'Just as we made peace with our greatest enemy in
war, with Egypt, so will we make peace with others who were our enemies
and who will be our partners in building peace in the Middle East."4 Peres
made a similar statement:
You know, basically what I've learned in my experience is when you talk
about peace, many people think in order to have peace, you have to have the
proper plan. I'm not so sure, because a plan without a partner is just theory.
What you need first is a partner. And if you find a partner, you can develop
3. Regarding the Netanyahu victory as an "accident," see Ian S. Lustick, Reflections
on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement, J. PALESTI-NE STUD., Autumn 1996, at 9-12.
4. Prime Minister Rabin referring to the Palestinians in his speech opening the
Summer Knesset Session, May 15, 1995 (emphasis added).
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a plan.5
On another occasion, Peres characterized the process as follows:
For many years, the custom was to negotiate with oneself. After all, it is
easier than to negotiate with another party. The change occurred when both
sides recognized that there are two parties to a conflict-that to negotiate,
there is a need for a partner. We learned that a peace plan without a partner
is a dead end, while a partner, even without a peace plan, may be a real
beginning. The difficult decision at the time, was to accept Yasser Arafat as
a partner.6
Savir, Israel's chief negotiator, also invoked the idea of "partnership" when
he stated: "Our Palestinian partners in peace, we feel we can work together
with you."7
In these public pronouncements, the presumptive referent of the first.
person pronoun "we" or "our" is to the Israeli government, representing the
State of Israel and the people of Israel. The "both sides" is likewise under-
stood to be a reference to the Israelis, taken as a whole, and the Palestini-
ans, taken as a whole. These certainly were the meanings that the speakers
of these words wanted their audiences, especially in Israel, persuaded to
accept as true. However, the speakers of these words were well aware that
the secrecy with which the Oslo agreement was negotiated and the furious
opposition it triggered, among both "rejectionist" Israelis and Palestinians,
were prima facie evidence that the real partnership was not between
"Israel" and "the Palestinians." Indeed, it was not even between "the State
of Israel" and "the PLO." The real partnership was between a group of
moderate and dovish political parties in Israel controlling the government
and diplomatic apparatus of the state in 1993 and the Arafatist wing of the
PLO in combination with a large percentage of the Palestinian population
in the West Bank and Gaza, though not within the Palestinian diaspora.
This was a political partnership with an axis crossing the boundary
between "Israelis" and "Palestinians" by linking one group of Israelis and
one group of Palestinians, tying their political fortunes to one another.
The core of this partnership was the Labor Party-Arafat axis, including
especially the relationship between the two security services tied formally
to the Israeli State and PLO institutions but more personally to Prime Min-
ister Rabin and Chairman Arafat. The partnership also had a number of
other important participants. The dovish/liberal Meretz party, Israeli
Arabs (Palestinians with Israeli citizenship), the Clinton administration,
several moderate Arab states, and much of the world community provided
the political resources the partnership needed to operate. Opposition crys-
tallized, not as an alliance between opponents of the Oslo process involving
public endorsement of one another and explicit and secret forms of coordi-
5. Prime Minister Peres, in answer to a question at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, April 29, 1996 (emphasis added).
6. Speech by Prime Minister Peres to the Annual Conference of the American-Israel
Public Affairs Committee, April 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
7. Uri Savir, Israel's chief negotiator, addressing his interlocutors at the formal
inauguration of permanent status talks, May 5, 1996 (emphasis added).
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nation, but as what Marxists used to call an "objective alliance"-an array
of forces and political actors whose interests in a particular outcome, the
destruction and failure of the Oslo process, led them to actions which,
without explicit coordination, multiplied their effectiveness in reciprocal
relation with one another. The core of this alliance was often described by
Prime Minister Rabin as between the Likud and Hamas, between those
Israelis devoted to maintaining the territorial unity of the "whole Land of
Israel" and those Palestinians who rejected the principle of dividing Pales-
tine between an Arab and a Jewish state.8 Serving as a political resource
base for this objective alliance opposing Oslo were the Jewish settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza, some small ultranationalist and fundamentalist'
Israeli parties, powerful and vociferous right-wing elements within the
American Jewish community, a number of U.S. Senators and Congressmen
anxious to please the most active elements within the Israel lobby, Palestin-
ian refugees angry at being largely ignored by the Oslo agreements, rejec-
tionist rivals to Fatah, such as the PFLP, within the PLO, leaders within
Fatah, such as Farouk Kaddoumi, unwilling to follow Arafat's lead, extrem-
ist states like Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Islamist movements throughout the
Muslim world.9
What was clear only to careful observers at the time is, in retrospect,
clear to most. The Labor Party leadership and its Israeli allies understood
very well that their fortunes were directly linked to the performance and
fortunes of Arafat and his dominant coalition within the Palestinian polity.
Despite many angry responses to charges from the Israeli right that dovish
politicians, including now-President Ezer Weizmann, were secretly conniv-
ing with PLO leaders and American diplomats to isolate, weaken, and pres-
sure annexationist-controlled Israeli governments, these charges were
8. In July 1994, Rabin sharply attacked his opponents on the annexationist right
for their fierce protests against Arafat by linking it in what I describe here as an "objec-
tive alliance" to Hamas. "There is an evil circle of cooperation between-not to compare
the two-the Hamas murderers and the radical right." JERUSALEM REP.,July 28, 1994, at
8. In April 1995, on Israel Television, Rabin was even more direct in his characterization
of the relationship between the Likud and Hamas: "The terrorist organizations are suc-
ceeding because the Likud has become the collaborator of Hamas and Islamic Jihad."
JERUSALEM REP., Apr. 20, 1995, at 19.
9. This, of course, was only one in a history of many political struggles involving
Israel and the Palestinians that have produced partnerships and alliance patterns cross-
ing the border between those two polities rather than aligning themselves with it. Prior
to the 1992 election, for example, there was an effective alliance-mostly objective but
partially coordinated-between the Bush/Baker administration, the PLO, and the Labor
Party, against the Government of Israel, led by Prime Minister Shamir and comprised of
or supported by all the right of center, ultranationalist, and fundamentalist groups in
Israel, and most of the Israel lobby in the United States. The two most dramatic mani-
festations of the Bush/Labor Party alliance were President Bush's 1989 remarks about
East Jerusalem as Israeli-occupied territory, which produced a coalition crisis and an
opportunity for the Labor Party to take power, and the withholding of American loan
guarantees in retaliation for settlement activity in the West Bank which induced signifi-
cant numbers of new immigrants in Israel to vote for Labor in the 1992 elections. Lus-
TncK, supra note 2, at 381-82, 423.
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fundamentally correct.' 0 This is the context for understanding that in the
Peres, Savir, and Rabin speeches quoted earlier, the primary referents for
the words "our," "we," "partner," and "partnership," were the Labor Party
and its Israeli allies on one side and the Arafatist wing of the PLO and its
Arab and international allies on the other, not "Israel" and "the Palestini-
ans" or "Israel" and "the Arabs."
Occasionally, and usually only implicitly, the reality of this actual,
cross-polity partnership surfaced in the public remarks of Oslo's Israeli
architects. Not long after the Oslo process became public knowledge, Peres
was asked why the negotiations were conducted in secret. "It is extremely
difficult to ever think openly," he responded, "for a simple reason; because
most people think that when you negotiate, the main task is to convince
the other party, where in fact what you have to do is to convince your own
people.""u In his very last speech, moments before his assassination by
one of the "enemies of peace" to which he referred, Rabin, addressing the
peace rally in Tel-Aviv, identified his partners and his adversaries.
There are enemies of peace who are trying to hurt us, in order to torpedo the
peace process. I want to say bluntly, that we have found a partner for peace
among the Palestinians as well: the PLO, which was an enemy and has
ceased to engage in terrorism. Without partners for peace there can be no
peace.12
That the Oslo process and the agreements which followed it were the prod-
uct of a cross-polity partnership between, to put it simply, Arafat and the
Rabin-Peres team, rather than a polity-to-polity partnership between "the
Israelis" and "the Palestinians," was most tellingly revealed by the conse-
quences of Netanyahu's razor thin victory over Peres in May 1996. Had
that victory been the result of a wholesale change in the attitude of the
Israeli public toward the principle of compromise with the Palestinians and
negotiations with the PLO, the Likud's return to power could not be inter-
preted in this way. But in fact, the Netanyahu victory was "accidental." It
occurred as a result of fluctuations within the Israeli electoratate that were
so small as to be within the range of random variation on a week to week
basis. In a polity as deeply and as evenly divided as Israel since the early
1980s, the only predictions about election outcomes safely made are that
elections will be very close and that the victor in one will be the vanquished
in another. In the volte-face of the new Israeli government toward the peace
process, and specifically toward negotiations with the Palestinian Author-
ity, one sees, not a change of mind of the Israeli public about "its" partner-
ship with the Palestinians, but the consequences of the destruction of the
10. Concerning the important role of deception in the thinking of political strate-
gists close to the Labor Party leadership see LuSTCK, supra note 2, at 425; Yoel Marcus,
And What About the Home Turin, HArz, Nov. 16, 1993, translated by the FBIS, Daily
Report: Near East and South Asia, Nov. 16, 1993, at 49-50. For an example of assess-
ments, by Netanyahu and others, of Peres's strategic use of secrecy in coordination with
his Palestinian partners, see MAAgrv, Feb. 25, 1996 (editorial).
11. Interview with Shimon Peres, Cable News Network, Sept. 1, 1993.
12. Remarks by Late PM Rabin at Tel Aviv Peace Rally, Nov. 4, 1995, <http://
www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/speeches,.
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actual partnership between the Labor Party and Arafat resulting from the
death of Rabin and Peres's narrow electoral defeat.
III. The Romance of Peace
Despite the horrific terror attacks in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv just months
before, polls taken after Netanyahu's election showed a majority of Israelis
in favor of continuing the peace process. 13 To this extent, at least, the
efforts by advocates of the process to depict Oslo as the only path, however
difficult, to Middle East peace and a sustainable future for Israel, met with
success. Indeed, much emphasis was placed by the Labor government on
embellishing these efforts with visions of a prosperous and neighborly
Middle East. Along with the direct political negotiations with Jordan and
the Palestinians, a wide-ranging and heavily publicized array of multilat-
eral conferences and negotiations pertaining to regional development and
infrastructural issues were undertaken. In 1994, prior to the much-her-
alded Casablanca conference for political and business leaders in support
of the peace process, a book entitled Plans for Regional Development and
Partnership was put together under the direction of Shimon Peres. The
development projects envisioned in that volume required $25 billion in pri-
vate and public investment, half of which was to be devoted to solving the
region's water problems.14 In his address to the conference, Peres referred
to a Middle East of three hundred million people. "The choice before them
is to remain poor and bitter, wearing the cloak of protest and the mantle of
fundamentalism, or to become 300 million producers and consumers
investing in posterity, to enter the 21st century as equals with the most
developed nations," he said.15 A more romantic, yet typical, evocation of
the "New Middle East" to which the Oslo road was said to be leading was
offered by Peres in his speech as Prime Minister to a joint session of the
United States Congress.
I believe we face an historic opportunity, perhaps of a galloping nature. If
we shall find the language of peace between us, we can bring peace to all of
us. Surely, nothing would capture the imagination of young people every-
where more than a gathering of all of us standing together-when I say all of
us, I mean all the leaders of the Middle East, all twenty of them, not one by
one, but together-and declaring the end of the war, the end of the conflict,
carrying the message to our forefathers and to our grandchildren that we are
again, all of us, the sons and daughters of Abraham, living in a tent of peace.
We shall tell them that together, as partners, we are going to build a new
Middle East, a prosperous economy; that we are going to raise the standard
of living, not the standard of violence; that we are going to introduce light
13. The Peace Index, HAARS-z, July 3, 1997.
14. See Sever Plutzqer, The Vision of Casablanca, YEDIOT AcHARONOT, Sept. 9, 1994,
translated inJPRS-NEA-94-053, Oct. 12, 1994, at 14-15. See also SHIMON PEREs, THE NEW
MIDDLE EAST 123-32 (1993).
15. Rabat RTM Television, Oct. 30, 1994, transcribed by FBIS, Daily Report: Near
East and South Asia, Nov. 1, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-211-S, p. 9.
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and hope to our peoples, to their destinies.' 6
The handshake at the White House, the promises of massive economic
aid, the new Middle East of enormous commercial opportunity, Nobel
Peace Prizes for Arafat, Peres, and Rabin, and the lavish and laudatory
attention by the international media and the leaders of the world's most
powerful nations were all part of a romance of peace designed to rally sup-
port, in both the Israeli and Palestinian/Arab communities, behind a deal
whose coldly calculable, eventual outcome was beyond what majorities on
each side were willing to accept. The necessary support for the substance
of the compromises that the partners knew would eventually need to
obtain was to be produced as a by-product of the process and the new
images of one another that this inspiring, romantic vision, with a powerful
sense of the historic about it, could trigger among Israelis and Palestinians
whose allegiances were not primarily to ideological visions but to practical
aspirations regarding their future, their physical and economic security,
their nation's long-term viability, and their children.
Many commentators ridiculed Shimon Peres's wondrous depictions of
the "New Middle East" of peace, prosperity, and freedom. Indeed, this
rhetoric was certainly not sufficient to produce a Labor Party victory in
1996. But the new welcoming attitude displayed toward the Jewish state by
so many previously hostile countries, the end of the Arab boycott, and an
economy booming at the prospect of an explosion in the access of Israeli
businessmen to worldwide markets, had an effect. No longer could the
right-wing advance its dream of consolidating Jewish sovereignty over "the
whole Land of Israel" as a vision of the future to attract and inspire the
Israeli public and justify costly policies. However much Netanyahu and his
allies may have continued to cherish that ambition, it was necessary to
characterize policies toward the territories and the Palestinians as designed
for enhancing security or advancing peace with due caution, rather than as
designed for pursuing the destiny of the Jewish people to rule the entire
promised land.
IV. Law over Politics: Netanyahu's Strategy to Defeat Oslo
After his electoral victory, Netanyahu retreated from earlier warnings that
he would not honor the Oslo Agreements. Though not swept away in the
kind of euphoria that briefly accompanied Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977, a
great many Israelis were still inspired and gladdened by the prospect that
dreams of peace, anchored in a liveable arrangement with the Palestinians,
might actually come true. If the Oslo process was to be effectively opposed
in Israel (and in the United States), it could not be opposed in principle,
but rather sabotaged in implementation. Thus, even before Netanyahu's
victory, most of Oslo's Israeli opponents chose to pay lip service to the
agreement while shifting discourse about it in a way that, if accepted,
16. 141 CONG. REc. H14256 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Prime Minister
Shimon Peres in address to joint session of Congress).
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would ensure its demise. In this way, they could reduce their risks of alien-
ating hundreds of thousands of Israelis inspired by the image and the
promise of the "handshake," Israelis whose conceptions of what might be
possible to achieve and forgive were beginning to change. Right-wing oppo-
nents of Oslo in Israel and in the American Jewish community have imple-
mented this strategy doggedly, with enormous sophistication, and with
substantial success.
The approach has been especially obvious in the activities of the Zion-
ist Organization of America (ZOA), whose leader, Morton Klein, before
Oslo, took that organization (traditionally an extension of Herut and the
Likud in America) to new extremes of antipathy toward Palestinians, terri-
torial compromise, and Jewish critics of Israeli policies. In the pre-Oslo
period, the ZOA posited that the PLO was purely a terrorist organization
with whom it would not be possible to negotiate under any circumstances.
After Oslo, the ZOA claimed that it did not reject the Oslo process itself,
but sought simply to ensure that the Oslo agreement was honored. Since
that time, it has waged a ceaseless campaign in Congress and in the media
to define the issue as whether or not Arafat has abided by the "legal"
requirements of the agreement, thereby seeking to transform the political
partnership between the Rabin government and the Arafatist wing of the
PLO into an ever more detailed list of opportunities to test and find want-
ing the good faith and trustworthiness of the Palestinian side. This
accounting included actions which the Palestinians have not done, but
which they, by this interpretation, were bound to do, such as extradition of
terrorists and change in the Palestinian "Covenant," or actions which they
were not, under the agreement, supposed to do, such as increase the
number of arms and armed personnel under the Authority's command or
maintain activity within el-Quds, but which they have done. Accordingly,
the modal ZOA press release, as well as the modal op-ed piece by Klein,
feature some variation on an accusation against the Palestinian Authority
of "another blatant violation of the Oslo Accords." 17 Under this banner, it
has not been difficult for the ZOA to enlist substantial numbers of Senators
17. See, e.g., State Department Report Again Whitewashes PLO Violations, ZOA PRESS
RELEASE (Mar. 8, 1996) <http://www.zoa.org/archives/pr-960308-1.html>; ZOA Praises
AIPAC for Acknowledging that PLO is Not in Compliance with Oslo Accords, ZOA PREss
RELEASE (Apr. 3, 1996) <http://www.zoa.org/archives/pr-960403-1.html>; Morton Klein,
PLO Violations: A Crucial Topic for Clinton-Netanyahu Discussions, (July 8, 1996) <http:/
/www.zoa.org/archives/opedl3.html>; Zionist Wants U.S. to Cut Aid to Make PLO Peace-
Abiding, THE MORPMNG CALL,July 21, 1996; PLO's Official Callfor Arab Boycott of Israel is
Flagrant Violation of Oslo, ZOA Pss RELS E (June 24, 1997) <http://www.zoa.org/
archives/pr-970624-2.html>; ZOA: PLO's Hiring of 150 Terrorists as Policemen is Blatant
Violation of Oslo, ZOA PRESS RELEASE (July 1, 1997) <http://www.zoa.org/archives/pr-
970701-1.html>; ZOA: Hanan Ashrawi's Vow that PLO will Never Extradite Terrorists Vio-
lates Oslo, ZOA PRESS RELEASE (Aug. 18, 1997) <http://www.zoa.org/archives/pr-970818-
1.html>; Morton A. Klein, The Four Legs of the 'Oslo Table' Have Collapsed, Aug. 18, 1997,
<http://www.zoa.org/archives/oped30.html>. See also ZOA IN THE NEWS (1994) (a col-
lection of letters to the editor, columns, and press releases distributed as a packet by
ZOA); Morton Klein, Three Years of PLO Violations: An Assessment of PLO Compliance
Since the Signing of the Israel-PLO Accords, Sept. 13, 1993 - Sept. 13, 1996, <http://
www.emet.com/zoa.htm.
1997 Ending Protracted Conflicts
and Representatives. These politicians, led by Benjamin Gilman, Chair of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, have accepted the definition of the
problem as measuring Palestinian, rather than Israeli, compliance with the
"terms of Oslo" and have embraced the tactic of using "non-compliance" as
a means of reducing, delaying, or eliminating American financial, diplo-
matic, and political support for the Palestinian Authority and for the peace
process more generally. 18
Just as energetically, but often less obviously and more consequen-
tially, the same tactic has been used in Israel by ostensibly "independent"
and "non-partisan" groups such as Peace Watch, Independent Media
Review and Analysis (IMRA), and the Institute for Peace Education. These
organizations advertise themselves as dedicated to genuine peace and as
advancing the cause by providing technical, objective, and unbiased evalua-
tions on the extent of compliance with the terms of the agreement. In its
reports, Peace Watch describes itself as "an independent non-partisan
organization monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements
signed by Israel and the PLO." 19 David Bedein adamantly denies charges
that his reporting is colored by his right-wing views, insists that his Insti-
tute for Peace Education is "evenhanded," and gives prominence on his
website to the claim that his Israel Resource News Agency is based both in
the Israeli International Press Center in Jerusalem and in "the Gaza Media
Center under the jurisdiction of the Palestine Authority."20 Joseph and
Aaron Lerner, who run IMRA, stress that their work, including interviews
with Palestinian and Israeli politicians about their reactions to reported vio-
lations of the Oslo Accords, opinion surveys to accent Israeli distrust of the
18. Regarding ZOA's role in lobbying Congress to adopt its legalistic, Palestinian
"violations" oriented stance toward the Oslo peace process, and in particular regarding
ZOA's role in the creation and implementation of legislation to link aid cut-offs to the
Palestinian Authority to these "violations," see ZOA Helps Create Congressional Groups to
Monitor PLO Violations, ZOA REP., May-June 1994. See also U.S. Aid Must Be Used as
Leverage, ZOA PRE=SS RELEASE, Mar. 11, 1996, <http://www.zoa.org/archives/pr-960311-
1.html>; JJ. Goldberg, To Aid, or Not to Aid, the PLO, JEWISH ExPoNENT (Philadelphia),
Sept. 25, 1997, at 20; Helen Freedman, Rabbis Protest Half Billion $$$ to PLO, JEWISH
PosT NEws, June 1995, <http://www.jewishpost.com/jewishpost/jpm0102.html>. It is
noteworthy that Irving Moskowitz, who has financed aggressive and controversial land
takeovers by Jewish fundamentalist groups in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem,
was identified in the May-June 1994 ZOA Report as having "sponsored" that issue of the
publication. See ZOA REP., supra.
19. See Natan Sharansky, Compliance is the Crux, THEJERUSALEM REP., Mar. 24, 1994.
For an endorsement of Peace Watch as "an impartial and non-partisan body, comprised
of Israelis from across the full spectrum of the political arena" and of its monitoring of
violations as accomplishing something that both opponents and supporters of Oslo
desire, see also three "Peace Watch Reports" [hereinafter Three Peace Watch Reports]
issued in Jerusalem. Institutions of the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem, Mar. 14, 1995;
Freedom of the Press Under the Palestinian Authority, Jan. 16, 1996; and PLO and PA Com-
pliance with Their Obligations to Prevent Terror Attacks During the Palestinian Authority's
First Two Years, Aug. 5, 1996.
20. Larry Derfner, Both Sides Now, JERusALEm PosT, Nov. 3, 1995, at 11; Leslie
Susser, The Peace Police, JERusALEM REP., Oct. 19, 1995, at 16; and David S. Bedein, Analy-
sis After Bibi Freed Sheikh Yassin: What Does It Mean to Have Yassir and Yassin Stand in
Hand (Oct. 20, 1997) <http://www.israelvisit.co.il/BehindTheNews>.
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Palestinians and disagreement with aspects of the peace process, and distri-
bution to the foreign press of evidence of Palestinian violations, "is careful
and accurate."21 Their mission has been described as "saving Israel from
itself, comparing the situation to that 'before the Yom Kippur War,' with
overconfident Israelis convinced they can give up major security assets and
still defeat the Arabs."22
The effect of these activists and the lists of "violations" they distribute
has been to undermine the peace process by demystifying its grand claims,
by defining public debate over the process as mainly a question of the
trustworthiness of the Palestinian side in the implementation of details of
the agreement, and by pushing Israeli officials toward punishing Palestin-
ian behavior. The approach tends to weaken the Palestinian partner within
the Palestinian community while forcing those Israelis who support the
agreement as a political framework to confront a Hobson's choice between
exposing themselves to accusations of acting as weaker bargainers than
those more fully committed to "Israeli" interests and abandonment of the
rhetoric of historic reconciliation including the images of peace, prosper-
ity, and acceptance evoked by Shimon Peres's conception of a "new Middle
East."
Peace Watch is the best known of these groups and makes the most
apparently convincing claim to non-partisanship. It was formed by two
right-wing activists in October 1993, just after the Washington meeting
between Rabin and Arafat. Its official purpose and declared intention is to
foster the prospects for a genuine Israel-Palestinian peace by keeping each
side focused on adhering to its commitments under the Oslo Accords.23 To
enhance its credibility, at least within different segments of the Israeli pop-
ulation, Peace Watch organizers enlisted figures with moderate reputations
from both the left and right of center-kibbutzniks such as Muki Tsur and
Elisha Shapira and rabbis living in West Bank settlements such as Yoel Ben-
Nun and Shlomo Riskin as well as Natan Sharansky.24 It also, very occa-
sionally, mentions some Israeli violations of the Accords. 25 Although the
centrists on the Peace Watch board of directors have accepted the logic that
"the best hope for peace is to look reality in the face, and not try to sweep
unpalatable facts under the carpet,"26 the activists who created and run
Peace Watch, Dan Polisar and Bob Lang, are committed annexationists and
opponents of any substantial political compromise between Israel and the
Palestinians. Lang, for example, was formerly spokesman for the Gush
Emunim founded Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and
Gaza.27 Similarly, Joseph and Aaron Lerner, who operate IMRA, and
David Bedein, who directs the Center for Peace Education, are personally
21. Susser, supra note 20, at 18.
22. Id.
23. Sharansky, supra note 19.
24. Three Peace Watch Reports, supra note 19.
25. Sharansky, supra note 19.
26. Susser, supra note 20.
27. Double Trouble, JERusALaEM REP., Mar. 7, 1991.
Vol. 30
1997 Ending Protracted Conflicts
and fervently committed to the demise of the Oslo peace process and to
thwarting any substantial political/territorial compromise between Israel
and the Palestinians.28
The main activity of these groups, wlhile stressing their "Joe Friday"
interest in "just the facts," is discovering and publicizing technical informa-
tion regarding violations of the peace agreements for use by Jewish and
Israeli right-wing opponents of Oslo and by the press to create and
strengthen perceptions that the Palestinians are not living up to their com-
mitments under Oslo or that the Israeli government is forsaking its own
rights under the agreement. The actual material made available to the pub-
lic, through Israeli and international wire services, widely distributed op-
ed pieces, and on the internet, includes taped interviews and speeches of
Palestinian leaders portrayed as revealing but not-widely-circulated evi-
dence of their nefarious intentions, detailed lists of security violations by
the Palestinian Authority (including constantly updated data on the
number of police and weapons held by the PA in excess of the levels stipu-
lated in the Accords), lists of "terrorists" whom the Palestinian Authority
refuses to extradite to Israel, lists of Palestinian actions in el-Quds and else-
where which can be interpreted as violations of the Accords, analyses of
Palestinian failure to "annul" the Covenant, and interviews with Israeli offi-
cials in which their reluctance to punish the Palestinian Authority for
infractions are exposed and ridiculed. The material also includes detailed
analyses of how the exact terms of the interim Accords can be aggressively
interpreted to depict Israeli settlement and land expropriation activity,
armed intrusions by Israeli forces into Palestinian areas, and territorially
minuscule "withdrawals" as permissible, while interpreted to require such
burdensome and constricted behavior by Palestinians as to make Palestin-
ian agreement to further progress toward the implementation of the
Accords impossible.
A particularly striking example of this latter tactic is provided in Oslo
Issues in Hebron, by Aaron Lerner, issued by the IMRA.29 The publication
poses the question "what is the maximum which Oslo allows Netanyahu to
demand?" Composed in November 1996, in the midst of intense negotia-
tions prior to the partial Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, Lerner shows
how a "strict reading" of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed in Washington on September 28,
1995 (popularly known as "Oslo II"), allows the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) to remain, where necessary, within Arab Hebron. The argument
faults the Netanyahu government for not "aggressively" utilizing these
"strict" interpretations of clauses in Oslo in the course of the negotiations.
This and other such memoranda issued by IMRA are particularly instruc-
28. See, e.g., Aaron Lerner, How About a Joint GoaI?,JERUsALEM PosT, Apr. 1, 1997, at
6; Susser, supra note 20.
29. Aaron Lerner, Oslo Issues in Hebron, IMRA-L Digest 89, Nov. 18, 1996, <http://
mofetsrv.mofet.macam98.ac.il/-izak/israel/a/0043.htmIl>. See also Aaron Lerner, So
Now We're Talking Oslo, IMRA-L Digest 93, Nov. 27, 1996, <http://virtual.co.il/
ctyervices/lists/archives/imra/nov96/msgOO016.html>.
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tive when compared to Lerner's immediate reaction to Oslo II where he
attacked that agreement as a serious Israeli retreat from the original Oslo
Accords.30 In the intervening year, he used Oslo as a legal document in an
aggressive, adversarial mode against the Palestinian side instead of directly
criticizing the peace process. He made this approach explicit in July 1996,
when he wrote to condemn those who referred to the spirit of Oslo. The
agreements, said Lerner, "are legal documents, and as legal documents
what counts is what is written-not some amorphous 'spirit."' 31
Not surprisingly, Benjamin Netanyahu used material produced by
Peace Watch and these other organizations extensively in his election cam-
paign. Various settler groups and other right-wing opponents of the peace
process, both in Israel and in the United States, including especially the
ZOA, regularly draw on the materials distributed by Peace Watch, IMRA,
and David Bedein.32 Their press releases and analyses are also commonly
cited in the mainstream media as authoritative.
When criticized for being partisan in their efforts, these groups
respond by stressing the facticity of their reporting, their commitment to
separating their personal views from their analyses, and their bottom-line
commitment to "simply" measuring "compliance."33 What they have fig-
ured out, however, and learned to apply in practice, is what I am seeking to
outline in theory. The same ambiguities in the agreement-whether it is a
legal or political document and whether it is between Israel and the Pales-
tinians or between the peace camps of Israeli and Palestinian moderates-
that can serve the interests of the moderates, can also serve the interests of
the opponents of the peace process. The crucial issue is the effectiveness
with which public discourse can be shaped and oriented.
In this context, the success of these activists is striking. Since the sum-
mer of 1996, a tripartite division within the Netanyahu government, and
possibly within Prime Minister Netanyahu himself, has existed. The divi-
sion has existed between those such as David Levy (currently not in the
government), inclined to resume the Oslo process as a partnership with the
PLO but without the myth and romance of Peres's "New Middle East;"
those, such as Yitzhak Shamir and Knesset member Beni Begin, for whom
nothing has changed, "the sea is still the sea and the Arabs are still the
Arabs," and for whom Oslo or any agreement is, in principle, anathema;
and those who have favored offering lip-service to the peace process in
30. Aaron Lerner, IMRA Reviews Oslo 2 Agreement, Oct. 1, 1995, <http://
mofetsrv.mofeLmacam98.ac.il/-izak/israel/a/0043.html>.
31. Aaron Lerner, Settlements: Catalyst for Peace, July 27, 1996, <http://free-
man.io.com/m online/aug96/lerner.htm>.
32. Among the annexationist and Jewish fundamentalist groups who publicize and
distribute the findings of Peace Watch, IMRA, and the Institute for Peace Education, are
the Zionist Organization of America, the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, The Jew-
ish Post, the Likud Party, Arutz 7 (a settler/Jewish fundamentalist radio station based on
a ship sailing off the Israeli coast), The Jewish Community of Hebron, VirtualJerusalem
(website), Information Regarding Israel's Security (website and subscription service),
and the Israeli and Global News Service (website and subscription service).
33. Susser, supra note 20.
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deference to the opinions of the majority of Israelis, while in fact using a
"work-to-rule" approach to the Oslo Accords-treating them not as a basis
for an evolving partnership, but as an array of legalist and public relations
weapons that can free Israel of its commitments, prevent further transfers
of territory to Palestinian control, and delegitimize Arafat and the idea of a
Palestinian state in the mind of Israeli public opinion.
It is this third option that the Netanyahu government has clearly cho-
sen. One indication is that, by the spring of 1997, the official Israeli Gov-
ernment Press Office and the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry
began to feature prominently in their distributed materials just the kind of
lists of Palestinian "violations" of the Oslo agreements that Peace Watch,
David Bedein, and IMRA were compiling.34 A somewhat more dramatic
indication was the radicalization of Israeli government policy in an
expanded East Jerusalem.35
The Oslo Accords pointed toward the future of East Jerusalem by mak-
ing its Arab population eligible for participation, as candidates and as vot-
ers, in the Palestinian Authority's legislative council elections. In addition,
Israel quietly permitted Palestinian security services to operate in East
Jerusalem and committed itself to permit the continued operation of
existing Palestinian institutions in the city, even as establishment of offices
by the Palestinian Authority itself within the Israeli demarcated boundaries
of the city was prohibited. But the Rabin-Arafat partnership was based in
part on silences about the future of the city, deferring negotiations about it
until the "final status talks." Still, shortly before Rabin's assassination,
increasingly detailed reports were appearing, later confirmed, of an agree-
ment between two high ranking Israeli and Palestinian politicians-Yossi
Beili and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen)-to share the city politically with
the Palestinians by creating a Palestinian capital in Abu Dis and the contig-
34. See, e.g., Information Div., Israel Foreign Ministry, Primary Palestinian Violations
of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, Jerusalem, Mar. 1997, <http://www.freeman.org/
m_online/apr97/violate.htm>; Palestinian Security Forces Violate Oslo in Jerusalem,
Israeli Government Press Office, Jerusalem, May 25, 1997; Avi Segal and Khalid Abu-
Ta'mah, Justice for Show: This is How the Judicial System Works in the Territories: 100
Years of Hard Labor (Its OK You'll Be Out Tomorrow), in YERusHALAYIM SUPPLEMENT, Israeli
Government Press Office, Jerusalem, August 29, 1997. On May 13, 1997, the Israeli
Government Press Office distributed an analysis of IMRA's Aaron Lerner discussing in
great detail the failure of the Palestinian Authority to comply with official Israeli
requests for extradition of wanted terrorists to Israel. See Israel Government Details PA
Refusal to Comply with Transfer Requests, <http://www.freeman.org/m.online/apr97/
violate.htm>.
35. In June 1967, the Israeli government promulgated a series of complex legal and
administrative measures which had the effect, not of annexing Arab East Jerusalem (el-
Quds) to Israel, but of increasing the size of the municipality of Israeli "Yerushalayim" by
more than seventy square kilometers. The Old City comprises only one square kilome-
ter of this swath of the West Bank which, stretching from Bethlehem in the south to el-
Bireh in the north, includes a dozen or so Arab villages and lands from more than a
dozen more. The Jordanian municipality of Jerusalem, between 1948 and 1967,
included only one ninth of the area designated by the Israeli Interior Minister in 1967.
See Ian S. Lustick, Has Israel Annexed East Jerusalem?, MIDDLE EAsT PoL'Y, Jan. 1997, at
34-45.
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uous Arab inhabited portions of what was historically the Arab city of el-
Quds.
Netanyahu's policies toward Jeru.salem, however, based in part on his
calculation that he could expand his political base by emphasizing Jerusa-
lem as a purely Jewish city, was to escalate Israeli activities in expanded
Jerusalem, thereby forcing Palestinian opposition to measures which were
not explicitly prohibited by the Oslo Accords and for which there could be,
at least initially, widespread Jewish support. First, he opened the tunnel
near the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif, sparking widespread violence and
heavy Arab andJewish casualties in October 1996. Then, needing to mend
fences with diehard opponents of Oslo after the Hebron withdrawal and
desiring to postpone an already scheduled further Israeli redeployment
from portions of the West Bank, Netanyahu initiated site preparation activ-
ity for a large new Jewish settlement, Har Homa, on Jabal Abu-Ghneim in
the southern extremity of expanded East Jerusalem. That act triggered a
complete halt to negotiations, indefinite postponement of the Israeli army
redeployment, and a wave of terrorist attacks inside Jewish Jerusalem and
in Tel-Aviv. Most recently, Jewish fundamentalists have been allowed to
take possession of a site in Ras el-Amud in the center of the portion of el-
Quds designated by the Beilin-Abu-Mazen plan as the future Palestine capi-
tal. What is most salient about these measures is not that they are disrup-
tive of the peace process, but that they have been defended by Israeli
government spokesmen as "legal" under the terms of the Oslo agreement. 3 6
Indeed, this defense is correct, and it is an excellent example of how Oslo
can be used as a legal agreement, via the aggressive exploitation of its exact
language, to thwart Oslo as a political partnership.
Conclusion
This analysis of the Oslo process has been based on a distinction between
an agreement as a legal arrangement binding two polities and an agree-
ment as a basis for a political partnership between segments of each of the
polities. The result of the analysis suggests that this distinction has strate-
gic importance for understanding the fate of the Oslo Accords, the charac-
ter of the rhetoric associated with advocacy of and opposition to Oslo
inside Israel, and the impact on the peace process of Netanyahu's election
victory in May 1996. However, in a democratizing world, where increasing
numbers of protracted conflicts -are being and will be addressed via negoti-
ations, it is worth considering how this kind of analysis might be advanced
by testing general propositions in a comparative context.
One hypothesis, well illustrated by the last year and a half of the Oslo
process, pertains to the consequences of too rapidly moving from political
partnership toward legal codex. Whether calculated or inadvertent, mov-
ing too quickly in this way is likely to destroy the process without exploit-
36. See, e.g., Statements by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defending the legal-
ity of Israeli construction projects for Jewish settlements under the Oslo Accords, Press
Conference, Wash. D.C., Sept. 7, 1997, <http://www.srael-mfa.gov.il>.
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ing its full potential as a vehicle for orchestrating a compromise anchored
in the maximum that mainstream opinion in each polity can be persuaded
to concede. A second hypothesis, illustrated by the Oslo process prior to
Rabin's assassination, is that too slow movement from political partnership
to legal codex, i.e. inordinate delay in the implementation of the agreement
and its transformation from a semi-secret deal between incumbents within
each polity to a legally binding settlement between the polities themselves,
has the effect of keeping the question of how much is being conceded on
the agendas of each of the polities for too long a period of time. Such a
delay can increase to dangerous levels the number of accidents-election
outcomes, terrorist incidents, uncontrolled provocations, international cri-
ses, and deaths of key players-capable of disrupting the partnership and
hence derailing the peace process.
Ultimately, it may be hypothesized that the optimal pace in this trans-
formation from political to legal modalities is determined by: 1) the gener-
osity of the compromise compared to what short-term coercive capabilities
make possible; and 2) the boldness of leadership displayed within each
polity in its readiness to confront internal, diehard opposition to any
compromise.
To the degree the political partnership is based on concessions made
by the side capable, in the short run, of enforcing its will via coercion, the
longer the side receiving the concessions can afford to wait for their actual
implementation and until the size of the bloc supporting peace on the coer-
cively stronger side increases. However, to the degree that these conces-
sions are not generous, relative to the demands of the mainstream on the
other side and relative to what could be enforced coercively in their
absence, the pace of implementation will need to be more rapid and com-
bined with a readiness on the part of both leaderships to confront and
neutralize diehard opponents to peace and its underlying partnership
within their own polities.
It was precisely the ungenerous aspects of the Oslo Accords, and their
ambiguity on key points with respect to what Palestinians would ultimately
be able to achieve, that required the Israeli government to confront extrem-
ist Jewish opponents more rapidly, ultimately more forthrightly, and prob-
ably violently, than the Rabin or Peres governments were willing to
orchestrate or endure. The Labor government, in other words, could have
been bolder against its internal adversaries or it could have been more gen-
erous toward the Palestinians, but it could not be neither and still succeed
in making peace.
But these are hypotheses only. One case can establish their plausibil-
ity, not their validity. Yet for those committed to preserving opportunities
for the success of Oslo, and for designing similar processes in other con-
flict situations across the globe, they may provide a valuable opportunity to
explore, analyze, and explain the fertile but fragile relationship between
legal and political aspects of peace agreements designed to end protracted
conflicts.

